Injured Sea and Maritime Workers, Part II - Understanding the Jones Act
INJURED SEA AND MARITIME WORKERS:
KNOWING YOUR RIGHTS UNDER MARITIME INJURY LAW - Part II
The Jones Act: When is a Vessel a Vessel and a Seaman a Seaman?
Maritime law is a complex area of the law. An injured seaman or maritime worker should consider seeking out an experienced maritime law attorney before settling any claim with an employer. A maritime law attorney will discuss the seaman’s potential avenues for seeking compensation for his injuries under the Jones Act given the facts of his case. A maritime law attorney will thoroughly evaluate the claimant’s case, and part of this evaluation will be to determine if the claimant will qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. If the individual qualifies as a seaman and can prove that his sustained injuries stem from his employer’s negligence, or the negligence of his fellow employees, the injured seamen can seek recovery of the following damages:
1. Wages lost from the time of the injury to the time of trial;
2. Loss of future wages;
3. Compensation for medical expenses already incurred and future medical expenses; and
4. Compensation for pain, suffering, and disfigurement.
Under the federal Jones Act , 46 U.S.C. 30101 et. seq., an injured seaman who sustains injuries in the course of his employment due to the negligence of his employers and/or co-workers can seek compensation for his injuries through a maritime personal injury lawsuit. The complaint which initiates the lawsuit may also include a claim that the vessel was unseaworthy. See Part I of this series of blogs which deals with the Doctrine of Unseaworthiness.
The Jones Act is specific for injured seamen, and provides a succinct definition of seaman. The “defining” task has been left up to the courts. Indeed, one of the major issues often arising in a maritime lawsuit brought under the Jones Act is whether the injured complainant will be deemed a seaman and therefore be able to avail himself of the remedies available under the Jones Act.
The analysis of whether or not the plaintiff is a seaman may first involve a determination by the court as to what vessel or vessels exist before determining whether the Plaintiff had a relationship to the vessel. See In re Two-J Ranch, Inc. 534 F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (W.D. La. 2008).
For the purposes of the Jones Act, a sea-going vessel will of course include freighters, barges, and oil tankers. In a 2005 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the definition of ‘vessel’ under the Jones Act to include every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance, used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” Stewart v. Dutra Cond. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 488 (2005). In Stewart, the High Court held that the Super Scoop, used in Boston’s “Big Dig” project was a vessel as applied to the Jones Act. Id. at 496. Interestingly, the Super Scoop navigated only short distances by manipulating anchors and cables every few hours. Based on this fact, the Super Scoop was found to be engaged in maritime transportation when the cause of action arose and was thus a vessel for a Jones Act analysis.
The Two-J Ranch Court used the “expansive” definition of vessel in Stewart to find that a dry dock and spud barge were vessels for the purposes of Jones Act analysis. The Two-J Ranch Court pointed out that these vessels moved up and down the river bank due to changes in the river’s level. In reaching its conclusion, the Two-J Ranch Court carefully distinguished the dry dock/spud barge vessels from a dry dock which is permanently moored by means of large chains. See Cope v. Vallette Dry-dock Co., 119 U.S. 626 (1887).
Now, let’s say that the vessel on which the claimant was injured is a “Jones Act” vessel under the Stewart case. The next step of the analysis is whether the injured complainant is a seaman.
The US Supreme Court has held that to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) his duties contribute to the function of its mission; and (2) he has a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). Under Chandris, land-based workers such as longshoremen, pilots, and those who work on fixed platforms are not seamen for the purposes of the Jones Act or general maritime law. Id. Such workers may have other remedies available for their injuries under, for example, the Longshoreman and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act.
Also, the injured seaman’s job duties need not be directly related to navigation; seaman for the purposes of the Jones Act may include cooks, drillers, and musicians employed aboard a vessel on more or less a permanent basis. Chenevert v. Clinch Drilling Co., 273 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1967). See also McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
The Chandris Court also stated that in evaluating whether a worker is a “seaman”, courts should not employ a “snapshot” test for seaman status, which test would inspect the situation only as it exists at the instant of the injury; rather the court must look at a more enduring relationship, employing the total circumstances of the worker’s employment. Chandris at 368.
In establishing what constitutes a "substantial" relationship, the Chandris Court adopted the 5th Circuit’s rule of thumb that a “worker who spends less than 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel of navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. See also Zertuche v. Great Lakes Design & Dock Company, LLC No. 08-40132 (5th Circuit 2009), a very recent case on this issue. Generally the 30 percent rule has been applied over the course of the plaintiff’s employment. An exception to this rule may arise where the plaintiff had only recently been reassigned to a permanent maritime position (e.g., to replace a crew member of vessel) from a land-based position.
Also a seaman will not necessarily lose his status when he is temporarily assigned by his employer to duties off the vessel providing he continues to perform a substantial part of his work on vessel. Thus a seaman who is injured while on temporary assignment to perform duties on shore may well be found to be a seaman so long as he still performs a substantial part of his work on the vessel. Schultz v. Louisiana, 94 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. La. 2000).
The foregoing is intended to provide a thumbnail sketch of recent case law in the area of Maritime Law as related to the Jones Act. Stay tuned for Part III which addresses Maintenance & Cure.
